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Coinmunity right-to-know about chemicals was established
in the United States as part of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986.  Whether community
right-to-know as implemented at the federal level in the
U.S. can be successfully applied to hazards reduction in
Mexico was determined given three basic assumptions for
right-to-know:  that the public can access information on
chemicals with the government acting as chief disseminator,
that an informed public has a means to participate in making
decisions affecting its interests, and that non-governmental
organizations exist with the ability to mediate between
citizens, government, and industry.  Information obtained
from 16 interviews conducted in Mexico and the U.S. combined
with research and case studies from the extant literature
suggest that community right-to-know cannot be successfully
applied to Mexico under present political circumstances.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  General Background
The accidental release of methyl isocyanate gas from a
Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India
on December 3, 1984, riveted the world's attention on the
horrors of hazardous chemical exposure.   The fatal incident
elicited the sympathies of millions of people but also
fueled broader criticisms of situations in many developing
countries where multinational corporations operate
industrial plants with apparent disregard to the
environmental contamination and human health risks
associated with their routine and sometimes catastrophic
chemical emissions.
In response to this tragedy and a subsequent leak of
toxic aldicarb oxime gas from another Union Carbide plant in
Institute, West Virginia almost a year later, Congress
enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act (EPCRA) as part of Title III of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986.  The purpose of the
law is to "'provide the public with important information on
-'•The Union Carbide plant was located two miles from the
center of the city in the midst of a squatter settlement.
Estimates given for the number of deaths caused by the
lethal cloud range from 1,400-10,000.  Upwards of 200,000
people were treated for injuries.  For a complete
description, see Bowonder, et. al. 1985.
hazardous chemicals in their communities, and to establish
emergency planning and notification requirements which would
protect the public in the event of a release of hazardous
chemicals'" (Pritchard 1988, p. 206).  This legislation
establishes a framework for emergency planning and response
at the local and state level and mandates certain industries
to provide information on toxic chemicals and potential
hazards located at their facilities to neighboring
communities and emergency planners (Pritchard 1988, p. 206).
A summary of the major provisions of SARA Title III is
included as Appendix A.
Since the passage of EPCRA, the international community
has looked to adapt aspects of the law to other
industrialized and developing nations.  At the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, delegates from around the world
discussed the activities of U.N. member nations with regard
to the worldwide production, use, transport, and management
of health risks from toxic chemicals and officially
recognized the principle of community and worker right-to-
know about these risks (United Nations 1992, Ch. 19).  A
number of international environmental organizations in
attendance at the UNCED negotiations have since begun to
outline the minimal requirements for establishing toxic
chemical inventories in individual countries or through an
international vehicle (World Wildlife Fund, 1993; Working
Notes on Community Right-to-Know 1992, p. 1).
Mexico has been identified as a country where community
right-to-know policies may serve a beneficial purpose.  As
with India, Mexico has been host country to a growing number
of U.S. industries since 1965.  The Border Industrialization
Plan, or "maquiladora" program, allows U.S. corporations to
operate manufacturing plants in the northern border region
of Mexico (Gereffi, 1991).  These two thousand export-
oriented assembly plants presently hire approximately half a
million Mexican workers and provide the economically
stressed country with a key source of foreign exchange
(Banco de Mexico 1991, p. 138; Texas Center for Policy
Studies (TCPS), 1990).  American firms are eager to relocate
to Mexico to take advantage of the low-wage labor force, and
lax enforcement of Mexican environmental regulations.^
Despite the provision in the program that obliges the
maquiladoras to transport all their hazardous wastes to the
U.S. for treatment and disposal, just over half actually do
(TCPS, 1990).  The remainder are likely to "lose track" of
their wastes by illegally dumping them in municipal sewage
systems, in open irrigation ditches, or unlined landfills
(Day Communications 1992; Selcraig 1992; Lewis, et. al.
1991).  This discharge of toxic pollutants and inadequately
treated hazardous wastes has heightened risks to health as
drinking water has become contaminated.  Air pollutants have
^See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 1991. In 1986,
maquiladora workers earned an average of $1.3 6 per hour
compared to an average of $14.31 per hour earned by U.S.
workers.  For a comprehensive review of Mexican
environmental policy, see Mumme, et. al. 1988.
also been linked to sharp declines in productivity of the
regions' agricultural sector.
The Mexican government's response to reports of
environmental abuses from the maquiladoras had been minimal
until the election of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in
1988 (Mumme 1991, p. 10).  Mr. Salinas, who has aggressively
sought ratification of the North American Free Trade
Agreement with the U.S. and Canada, has been sensitive to
American and Mexican environmental groups that oppose
accelerating industrial expansion in the border area without
drastically improving environmental protection (National
Wildlife Federation 1991, p. 1).  Efforts to reform
environmental policy in Mexico have been crippled, however,
by inadequate funding of, and corruption and patronage
within, an array of agencies responsible for implementing
environmental policy (Mumme 1991, p. 29).  And apart from a
recent attempt to coordinate the regulatory and enforcement
activities of several federal agencies with overlapping
environmental jurisdictions, Mr. Salinas has directed most
of his initiatives toward ameliorating Mexico City's choking
air pollution.
ͣ^The main agency with legal responsibility for the
implementation of environmental policy since 1988 has been
the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE).
In mid 1992, SEDUE became SEDESOL, the Secretariat of Social
Security.  Two offices within the new agency, the Institute
Nacional de Ecologia and the Procuraduria del Medio
Ambiente, carry out regulatory and enforcement functions,
respectively.  The National Ecology Commission, an
interagency body, coordinates federal environmental policy
activity among different agencies (from a conversation with
Alfonso Garcia Gutierrez, environmental engineer at the
Although a few voices are protesting the toxic threats
to communities surrounding the maquiladoras, the public
remains largely unaware of the amount and types of pollution
responsible for its health problems.  Officials from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Mexican
environmental agency, the Secretariat of Social Security,
SEDESOL, have embarked on the first stage of the Integrated
Border Environmental Plan which "calls for the establishment
of requirements for public availability of data on emissions
and effluents of pollutants and other elements of a right-
to-know program in the Border Area," including information
on the storage of hazardous wastes and the publication of
environmental indices and data (U.S. EPA and SEDUE 1992, p.
V-49).   The Plan also proposes the creation of Public
Advisory Committees that will [1] serve as conduits for the
public dissemination of information concerning specific
projects and programs pursued under the Plan and, together
with the Plan Coordinators, serve as a clearinghouse for the
receipt of public comments from area residents and others
related to the Plan and its implementation; and [2] promote
community relations activities and right-to-know policies"
(U.S. EPA and SEDUE 1992, p. V-48).
National Autonomous University of Mexico, October 27, 1992,
in Chapel Hill, NC).^The Integrated Environmental Plan for the Border Area was
originally co-authored by EPA and SEDUE in 1992.  It is
unclear at this time what role SEDESOL and other agencies
will play in its implementation.
If, through this plan, the NAFTA, international law, or
national legislation, data documenting maquiladora (and
other industrial) emissions are made available to the
public, the utility of such a policy for Mexicans may be
compromised by factors such as the political characteristics
and institutional arrangements of Mexico's government, the
existence of legal antecedents for information policy, the
character of public participation, the role of non¬
governmental organizations (NGOs) in decisionmaking, and
limits to financial and technical resources.
B.  Purpose of Research
This study is an attempt to determine the whether
community right-to-know as implemented at the federal level
in the U.S. can be successfully applied to hazards reduction
in Mexico, a topic of increasing relevance for
environmentalists and government policymakers concerned with
the environmental impacts of NAFTA.  The paper defines a
successful policy as one that satisfies three fundamental
assumptions identified with the implementation of EPCRA.
The first, embodying the basic definition of right-to-know,
is the assumption that the public actually has access to
information on chemicals.  A corollary to this assumption
states that public access is facilitated when government
assumes the primary responsibility for disseminating the
information.  The second is the assumption that the informed
public has a means to participate in making decisions
affecting its interests.  The third is the assumption that
NGOs exist with the ability to mediate between citizens,
government, and industry.
The paper will evaluate each assumption for the Mexican
case by comparing the historical and legal precedents for
right-to-know, public participation and decisionmaking, and
the role of NGOs as mediators between the public and federal
and state institutions in each country.  In limiting the
scope of the study to these factors the author does not wish
to negate the importance of the fiscal and technical
requirements for right-to-know.  However, without attempting
to look first at the political environment in which right-
to-know functions, premature investments by the U.N.,
international NGOs, or the U.S. in technical assistance and
equipment may produce little more than an exclusive,
internal data collection program.
II. METHODS
This study combines information gleaned from the extant
literature pertaining to risk communication, U.S. and
Mexican environmental policy, and Mexican culture and
politics, with excerpts from conversations and interviews
conducted with representatives from environmental
organizations, advocacy groups, academia, government, and
industry in both Mexico and the U.S.
^These assumptions are derived from Susan Hadden's extensive
analysis of EPCRA and community right-to-know presented in
her book, A Citizen^s Right to Know; Risk Communication and
Public Policy (1989), and related articles.
A total of sixteen individuals were interviewed within
a three week period from May 22 to June 15, 1992 during a
trip to Mexico City and the sister cities of Matamoros,
Taumaulipas/Brownsville, Texas; and Tijuana, Baja
California/San Diego, California.  Appendix B lists the
individuals, their affiliations, and dates of interview.
The list does not include the name of the one interviewee
who requested anonymity.
An interview guide was prepared and translated into
Spanish before departure.  A total of 46 questions were
organized into five topic areas: public access to
information; industry, government, and citizen
relationships; provisions of the Border Plan; political
efficacy; and legal precedent.  A copy of the questions, in
English, is included as Appendix C.  The use of an interview
guide versus an interview schedule provided flexibility and
allowed questions asked of each interviewee to be adapted to
specific areas of expertise and insights of that person.  No
interview commenced without the written consent, in Spanish
or English, of each individual.
The names of prospective interviewees were compiled
from preliminary research and personal conversations with
academics, activists, and government officials in the U.S.
Prior to the commencement of the travel period, a core set
of individuals was solicited for interview by telephone or
letter.  Other names were identified in Mexico by
interviewees themselves and through additional
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conversations.  The overall number of interviews was limited
due to communication barriers, restricted timeframes, and
scheduling difficulties.  The final set of sixteen, while
not a representative sample, does reflect the diversity of
knowledge and perspective one would expect from such a broad
collection of individuals.
Because the subject of community right-to-know is
relatively new and changing, much of the information
available comes from nonacademic sources.  The incorporation
of subjective case material is not intended as a substitute
for systematic study but as a first step in expanding the
study of environmental policy to include comparative
politics.
III.  ELEMENTS OP RIGHT TO KNOW IN THE UNITED STATES
A.  Why Inform the Public
EPCRA was born out of concern over risks to public
health in the U.S. from accidental releases of industrial
chemicals into the environment.  But why, considering the
scope and severity of preceding international and domestic
disasters, did Congress approach hazard reduction by
positioning the EPA as information broker between industry,
state government, and the public in lieu of directing the
agency to set stringent standards for chemical emissions?
The incorporation of public information disclosure as the
principle element of the U.S. approach to hazard reduction
requires some explanation.
Susan Hadden (1989a, p. 13) defines right-to-know as "a
late twentieth-century Jeffersonian approach to the risks
posed by hazardous chemicals in our communities," whereby an
informed public participates actively in the political
process.  Another perspective proffers that EPCRA is a means
to
open government regulation to citizens and to cure
the market's failure to provide adequate
information on industrial hazards.  Right to know
is thus an incremental evolution of American
democracy and capitalism, carrying on the
tradition of using information to achieve public
ends—be it putting labels on food, ensuring truth
in lending, or placing government in the sunshine
(Goldman 1992, p.317).
Both these notions stem from an intrinsic belief held
in American society that individuals have a right to
information that may impact their privacy, health, and well-
being.  A corollary to this belief, implicit in the above,
is that information disclosure is not merely an end in
itself but is the necessary basis for enlightened
decisionmaking and action.  Hadden (1989b, p. 17, 204)
develops this concept into a typology, reproduced in Table
1, that identifies the purpose, governmental role, recipient
of information, and degree of social change produced for
four types of right-to-know.  Even the most basic form,
which aims solely to allow citizens to find out about
chemicals, requires the involvement of government in
ensuring citizen access to information.
As part of a more complex strategy to manage risks.
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data and other information on
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chemicals become tools which citizens can wield to educate
themselves about the risks in their communities and
influence policy decisions that affect risk outcomes (EPA
1992, p. 1).  The extent to which information can be used to
influence decisions or alter the balance of power, however,
depends largely on whether the public acquires the data in a
form that is understandable, able to be manipulated, and
relevant—a task that may or may not be adequately fulfilled
by government alone (Hadden 1989b, p. 16).
Table 1.  Typology of Rights to Know
Type Purpose Governmental Role  Social Change
Basic    Ensure that
citizens can
find out about
chemicals.
Risk     Reduce risks
Reduction from chemicals,
preferably
by voluntary
industry action
but also by
government if
necessary.
Better Allow citizens
Decision- to participate
making   in making
decisions about
hazards in the
community.
Ensure data are
created and
available.
No notable
Regulators use     Minor
information to
create new
standards or enforce
existing ones if
industry fails to
police itself.
Provide citizens
with analyzed data,
methods for
manipulating and
interpreting data.
Some
Altered  Empower citizens Provide citizens   Major
Balance  with respect to  with analyzed data,
^Hadden (1989b, p. 211) concludes that the ideal type of
right-to-know in the U.S. would be a kind of "informed
consent," that does not "rule out participation in
decisionmaking but does not rely so heavily on it that
apathy or selfishness would call the entire right into
question."
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of Power  big government,  means of
industry.        participating.
From Susan G. Hadden, A Citizen^s Right to Know. Westview
Press, 1989.
The EPA, recognizing the power of the public to affect
decisionmaking, envisioned right-to-know as a regulatory
alternative to the agency's standard "command and control"
practice.  Americans have demonstrated a distrust of the
government's ability to protect health and the environment
within the context of its current regulatory apparatus
(Hadden 1989b, p. 11; Lynn 1990, p. 101).  "The right-to-
know approach, by contrast, turns over a mountain of data to
local citizens and leaves it up to them to decide how to
work with local company officials to make a facility safe."
(Kriz 1988, p. 3006)  The flexibility that this strategy
affords to decisionmaking, in addition to its advantages of
lower cost and non-coercive style make it attractive for
government, industry, and citizens alike.  And, in fact,
under pressure from citizens armed with TRI data instead of
the gun of EPA regulations, polluting industries have begun
to voluntarily to cut their toxic emissions (Elkins 1989, p.
17; Kriz 1988 p. 3008; EPA 1991).
B.  Historical and Legislative Antecedents
Despite the relative promptness with which Congress
passed EPCRA, the road leading to community right-to-know
was laid, brick by legislative brick, over a period spanning
two decades.  In 1966 Congress enacted the Freedom of
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Information Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552) which established a
statutory precedent by ensuring public disclosure of federal
agency records (Franklin and Bouchard 1986, p. 1-9).  Four
years later in 1970, a similar provision for public
disclosure of environmental impact statements generated by
federal agencies was included as part of the National
Environmental Protection Act (P.L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852).
Federal rules requiring the public disclosure about
toxic chemicals by the private sector, however, did not
appear until 18 years after the right to access government
records was legally established.  The Hazard Communication
Standard (29 CFR, Ch. XVII, Sec. 1910.1200), first
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration in 1983, obligates certain manufacturers to
assess chemical hazards in their workplaces, communicate
these hazards to employees, and develop a training program
to familiarize employees with safe work practices (Hadden
1989b, p. 22)  The final version, promulgated in 1988,
extends these requirements to all nonpublic businesses
except the construction industry.
Of course even the achievement of worker right-to-know
did not occur in a vacuum.  Remaining faithful to the
saying, "if the states lead, the feds will follow," a number
of states and municipalities had, as early as 1981, passed
laws and ordinances to inform workers and citizens about
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toxic and hazardous chemicals^.  By 1985, the proliferation
of state and local worker and community right-to-know laws
combined with general acceptance of the principles of right-
to-know, convinced the chemical industry and Congress that
"a uniform federal law was not only inevitable but
desirable" (Hadden 1989b, p. 28).
C.  Public Participation Through Access to Information
Questions regarding the quantity and type of
information that should be made available to "nonexperts"
have occupied the center of debate over how to interpret and
implement right-to-know since its enactment.  Some have even
argued that available data far exceeds the technical
understanding of most citizens and is all together
insufficient to answer the basic questions about chemical
safety that guide public participation in decisionmaking
(McCallum and Covello 1989, p. 22; Roe 1989 p. 11).  If,
however, right-to-know is to embody the democratic axiom of
knowledge as power, then the government must either assume
responsibility for monitoring, disseminating, and
interpreting data for citizens or at least guarantee that
these tasks are performed satisfactorily by non-governmental
agents (Hadden 1989b, p. 16).
^Philadelphia, in 1981, was the first city to enact right-
to-know legislation that covered both workers and the
community.   See Chess 1984, for a history of the passage of
the law.  In 1983, New Jersey followed suit and passed the
Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act, upon which EPCRA was
modeled.  Hadden 1989b outlines the law's history and
implementation.
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Once citizens possess a clear understanding of the data
their next step in the decisionmaking process is to act on
what they know (Hadden 1989c, p. 301; Goldman 1992, p. 318).
At this stage, their efforts to participate may be hindered
or prohibited by a number of institutional barriers.  The
first occurs when the public is not even aware that it has
the right-to-know, as may be the case when a government is
not committed to disseminating the information or lacks the
resources to do so effectively.  The second barrier results
when officials responsible for program implementation deny
the need for citizens to have the right-to-know. Another
barrier may arise when right-to-know programs are designed
without a clear emphasis on avenues for public action.
Most significantly, citizens' ability to act may be
obstructed by a "lack of organizations through which
citizens can meet, set priorities, and work with government
and industry" (Hadden 1989c, p. 306).  The existence of
these non-governmental organizations, "mediating
structures", or public interest groups is essential to the
functioning of a democracy and a means by which citizens
express their values and effect change (Berger and Neuhaus
1977, p. 6; Lynn 1990, p. 101).
A recent study of TRI use by Lynn, et. al., (1992)
verifies that mediating structures in the U.S. have been
instrumental in educating the public about right-to-know,
and in particular, the TRI,  Public interest groups have
assisted citizen efforts to use the TRI to enact new
15
legislation, encourage industry pollution prevention
methods, enforce regulations through the courts, and convene
face-to-face meetings between community groups and industry.
Reports published by these organizations documenting toxic
releases classified by top-emitters, geographic location, or
category of chemical, were found by citizen groups to be the
most useful form of TRI data.^  Voluntary organizations "are
the key point of access for grassroots requests from
community groups and individuals who either cannot access
the TRI easily or have never heard of it" (Lynn, et. al.
1992, p. 4).  These findings correspond with extensive case
material that documents the range of activities undertaken
by citizens equipped with detailed information and the
successes achieved through their participation (Tryens, et.
al., 1990; Settina and Drum 1991).
Advocates for an international toxics inventory may
take for granted that essential mediating infrastructures
exist in most developing nations and, moreover, that they
have adequate resources and political leverage.  The types
of institutional arrangements and political climate that
determine the activity of Mexican environmental NGOs and
citizen groups is the subject of the next section.
IV.  A LOOK AT MEXICAN POLITICS
A.  Characteristics of an Authoritarian Regime
Reports were collected from 4 6 national, regional, and
state-level public interest and environmental organizations,
16
Scholars of Mexican politics generally agree that for
the past 60 years Mexico has engaged in an authoritarian
style of governance.  This type of political system differs
significantly in character from the "democratic" system
familiar to most Americans m a number of ways.   Within a
traditional authoritarian regime one finds limited
pluralism, restricted autonomy of interest groups, low
popular mobilization coupled with high deference to the
system, rulership defined by clientelism, and extreme
centralization of decisionmaking (Purcell 1975, p. 12;
Cornelius and Craig 1988, p. 15)  The relationship between
the state and interest groups in Mexican authoritarianism is
not only dependent but exhibits corporatist features.  In a
corporatist arrangement, various public interests are
represented by a limited number of compulsory organizations
that are officially sanctioned, often heavily subsidized,
and non-competitive.  In exchange for allowing the state to
impose constraints on their leadership and demands, they
receive exclusive representation of a separate sector of
Robert Dahl, in Polyarchy (1971), argues that a democratic
system requires, as a minimum, that citizens have both the
right to participate, i.e., inclusiveness, and the right to
open dissention, i.e., liberalization.  Dahl has developed a
typology of four political regimes positioned along these
two necessary dimensions of a democratic system.  The four
types include polyarchy (most democratic), inclusive
hegemony, competitive oligarchy, and hegemony (least
democratic).  According to his typology, a country such as
the U.S. in reality is classified as a polyarchy since it is
highly inclusive and extensively liberalized.  In contrast
to the U.S., Mexico's high level of inclusiveness yet
pervasive restrictions on public contestation, would
classify it as an inclusive hegemony.
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society (Collier and Collier 1979; as cited by Sloane 1984,
p. 6).  The interests of organized labor, the peasantry, and
the middle-sector which includes, among others, professional
associations, white-collar government employees, merchants,
neighborhood associations, and student groups, form the
respective labor, agrarian, and popular trisectors of the
regime and are represented by one or more designated quasi-
governmental organizations. °
Control over these corporate relationships and
essentially all decisionmaking is centralized in the
executive branch of the Mexican federal government.    The
concentration of power into the hands of the president, or
"presidencialismo", is both a consequence of and contributor
to the domination of a single political party, the
Institional Revolutionary Party (PRI), in federal, state,
and municipal elections since 1929.   Through the apparatus
1 n  •  • • • •ͣ^"Unionized workers belong either to the mam Confederation
of Mexican Workers (CTM) or other sindicates affiliated with
the Congress of Labor.  Campesinos and communal land holders
belong to the National Peasant Confederation (CNC).  Middle-
sector groups belong to the National Confederation of
Popular Organizations (CNOP).  Members of the business
community, although not a traditional sector of the regime,
must join one of the government-chartered confederations of
chambers of industry (CONCAMIN), and commerce (CONCANACO)
See Purcell 1975.  Frustration with the waning
responsiveness and corrupt leadership of the state-chartered
labor, peasant, and popular organizations during the
economic crisis of the 1980s has lead to the emergence of
numerous autonomous and apolitical popular movements and
organizations.  These movements often cross boundaries
between the traditional sectors and have resisted government
cooptation.  See Cornelius and Craig 1988 (p. 29).
^^The following discussion is from Cornelius and Craig 1988.ͣ• ͣ^Camp (1993, p. 13) defines presidencialismo as "the
concept that most political power lies in the hands of the
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^^^^^^«M^#fflfeS**-v,-::
of the PRI, the official party and veritable appendage of
the government, the president hand-selects nominees for
cabinet and other high-level bureaucratic positions, seats
in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, party leadership,
state governorships, municipal offices, and most
significantly, his own successor.    An almost assured
victory at the polls for these presidential picks and, not
coincidentally, the PRI, ensures their allegiance to the
chief executive and his policy initiatives.  In cases where
a state or local official strays from subservience or causes
embarrassment for the president. Congress can, under
executive order, dissolve the offending government
(Cornelius and Craig 1988, p. 19).
The president's, and by extension, the PRI's influence
over congressional candidates, effectively redefines the
role of legislators as representatives serving their
constituents to affirmative rubber stamps for presidential
legislative initiatives and cabinet appointments.  With the
exception of a few isolated opposition voices, legislators
generally do not level criticisms against the administration
(Camp 1993, p. 138).  Similarly, state and municipal
governments support the president in exchange for federal
revenues and services, distributed at the discretion of the
president, and all that is good and bad in government policy
stems personally from the president."ͣ' ͣͣ^Historian Lorenzo Meyer (1986, as cited in Cornelius and
Craig 1988, p. 3 0) has said of the PRI, "It was a party that
was born not to fight for power, but to administer it
without sharing it."
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administration (Cornelius and Craig 1988, p. 16).  Federal
judges and judicial branch officials, who are appointed by
the president as well, shy away from cases of political
nature.  At lower levels the legal system suffers from
rampant corruption and political manipulation and in some
instances has employed the use of torture.
One might presume from the description above, as some
have in the past, that Mexican authoritarianism arises from
an authoritarian political culture (Cornelius and Craig,
1989) .  However, Booth and Seligson's study of urban
Mexicans (1989) effectively challenges this hypothesis.  The
study concludes that these citizens strongly endorse
democratic liberties such as participation in political
activities, support for the rights of dissenters to
participate, and opposition to government action to legally
suppress democratic liberties (Booth and Seligson 1989, p.
113).  Coleman and Davis (1988, p. 8) suggest that the
contradiction between Mexicans' personal belief in democracy
and public expressions of support for the authoritarian
system may derive from a practical need to "gain access to
rewards" which only deference can deliver.
Nevertheless, even in the face of these persistent
operational realities, recent political electoral events
have prompted many scholars to reconsider the intractability
ͣ^^See article in the Washington Post, November 14, 1992 and
the San Antonia Express News. April 1, 1993 for recent
accounts of investigations into charges of human rights
abuses and corruption by state law enforcement officials in
Baja California.
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of the Mexican authoritarian system.  The 1988 national
elections wherein the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de
Gortari was elected by a plurality instead of a majority and
nearly half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were
filled by opposition candidates, resulted in the most
serious challenge to the PRI's hold on the presidency and
legislature since the Revolution (Camp 1993, p. 152). ͣ' ͣ^ The
election results radically transformed the relationship
between the executive and legislative branches, by creating,
"for the first time in Mexican history, the conditions for
vigorous multiparty competition within [the legislative]
branch of government and between Congress and the president"
(Cornelius, et. al., 1989, p. 25).  Sensing a new
vulnerability, both to reformist elements within the PRI
itself and growing numbers of disaffected middle-class and
younger voters, Salinas proclaimed his commitment to
reforming the electoral process and corporatist system as a
political complement to his plans for liberalizing the
economy (Cornelius, et. al., 1989, p. 29).
^See Smith 1989.  The election produced another victory for
the PRI but not without controversy.  Salinas de Gortari won
amidst charges of fraud by his major challenger, Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas, presidential candidate of the Democratic Front for
National Reconstruction (FDN), a coalition of dissident PRI
supporters and center-left opposition parties.  The vote
count, delayed for several days on account of a government
computer breakdown, eventually gave Salinas de Gortari 50.7
percent of the vote, and Cardenas 31.1 percent.  A
demonstration of 200,000 opposition supporters took to the
streets of Mexico City following the announcement to
denounce Salinas de Gortari and declare Cardenas the true
victor.  Regardless of whether or not fraud was indeed
perpetrated, guesses at the true results still gave Salinas
a plurality with 4 2 percent of the vote.
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still, the tenor of Mexico's political future remains
uncertain.  Only three years later, the PRI's legislative
majority was restored during the 1991 congressional
elections, effectively quieting opposition voices and
dampening hopes for a permanent advance toward greater
democracy.  At the same time, Salinas pursued his electoral
reforms by consolidating his power to remove governors
elected in contentious races (Camp 1993, p. 172).  Although
it appears that political reforms leading to a more
participatory and pluralistic society have taken a back seat
to the economic agenda, proponents of free trade agree that
the NAFTA will have "certain consequences for
democratization and yield benefits thereto" (Camp 1993, p.
175).  There is little agreement, however, on what form or
how fast these changes will occur.
B.  Limits to Public Participation in Decisionmakinq
A significant feature of the present Mexican system as
regards the decisionmaking process is the executive monopoly
of the national policy agenda.  Susan Kaufman Purcell
(1975), describes the unique process by which policies are
initiated, advanced, and implemented.
The president initiates the process by committing
himself to a particular idea or policy.  His commitment can
usually be attributed to his own personal goals or values,
ideas or pressures from abroad, or his desire for increased
support and legitimacy among elites.  Rarely, if ever, does
the president's interest ensue from the pressure of interest
22
groups.  As explained previously, these groups exhibit
limited autonomy, few independent resources, and low
mobilization.  Thus, interest groups play a reactive role in
the process by either supporting or opposing, in deferential
way, the president's decisions.
Once the president commits himself to a course of
action, deliberations over the policy are carried out in
secret among a small group of his advisors.  It is during
this phase that the president and his colleagues consider
public opinion. Government decisionmakers view "mass
attitudes and preferences...as constraints" on policy making
that help "to define the parameters for politically feasible
and legitimate action in a problem area" (Cornelius and
Craig 1988).  After assessing the likely reaction of the
public, the president sets the government in motion to
mobilize supporters and demobilize critics.  Should the
policy relate coincidentally to a current or recent popular
protest or demand, the president waits for time to pass
between the expression of the demand and his decision to
proceed so as not to raise doubts about his control of the
issue and encourage further dissention.
Once a decision is finalized, the president makes a
formal announcement to the public and/or a legislative
proposal, at which time his name is officially linked to the
policy.  If the proposal is controversial, the president
will sometimes delay his announcement to the Congress until
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the final days of the legislative session in order to
circumvent public debate. .
The main strategy for demobilizing critics is to
incorporate them into the implementation phase once the
policy has been approved by Congress.  Opposition groups may
be invited to participate in the process of hammering out
specific elements of law from vague legislation.  The
process, one of divide and conquer, involves group leaders
meeting individually, by sector, with an administrative
official to present their requests.  The separate meetings
are a means of preventing the consolidation of common
interests among sectors into a collective set of demands.
In instances where the president fails to demobilize the
opposition,
the dissatisfied groups may become highly
mobilized and determined to improve their
situation by using their only recourse —
disruptive or violent activity.  When such
disruption occurs, the regime first will repress
the leaders of the demonstrating groups and
replace them with individuals who are willing to
cooperate and who are able to demobilize their
followers (Purcell 1975, p. 134).
For most citizens, opportunities for participation in
the system are restricted to voting, formal membership in
one of the official sectorial organizations or through
informal patron-client relationships.  In the third class of
political activity, "patrons" situated within the government
bureaucracy award benefits such as public services, favors,
and access to decisionmakers, to their "clients" in return
for loyalty, deference and mobilization on behalf of
24
government officials or the official party during elections
(Cornelius and Craig 1988, p. 22).  Brokers, who operate
independently of specific loyalties and for a fee, also
guide citizens through the bureaucratic maze and channel
their demands up through the administrative hierarchy.
Evelyn Stevens (1974) suggests that these intermediaries
function as bottlenecks in the "irrational" Mexican
bureaucracy.
If the bureaucracy were to operate under rational
norms, ordinary citizens could often act as their
advocates...but if this were to happen, the
cumulation of direct demands on government which
required immediate settlement might be
intolerable...Brokers act as buffers; they
disguise the fact that the government cannot
always give everybody what they want or need, or
to which they have a juridical right." (p. 93).
V.  ANALYSIS
A.  Information Access and Mexican Politics
With a description of the implementation of right-to-
know and supportive structures in the U.S. and an
understanding of the Mexican political system in hand, it
becomes possible to assess how political conditions in
Mexico fulfill or deny the three assumptions for
establishing an effective right-to-know policy: first, that
the public will in fact have access to relevant information
and that its primary means of access will occur through
government dissemination; second, that once the public
acquires information, it will have a means of participating
in decisionmaking on issues germane to its interests and
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knowledge; and three, that existing NGOs can assist the
public in working with government and industry.
Restated, the first and most basic assumption requires
an answer to the question of whether a federal Mexican law
incorporating community right-to-know provisions would
ensure true public access to information and satisfactorily
involve the government as the chief disseminator.  This
discussion will focus on the legal precedents for
information disclosure such as described for the U.S. and
the relationship between information and government activity
in Mexico.
Owing to the successful implementation of FOIA, NEPA,
the HCS, and local variants of right-to-know, the concept of
federal information disclosure in the U.S. had already found
a legitimate role in serving the public interest by the time
it was applied to risk reduction.  In Mexico, citizens have
a similar legal right to know about hazards in the workplace
and limited environmental information.  The Mexican Federal
Labor Law of 1970 and its regulations, require employers to
provide workers with information about health and safety
risks associated with toxic chemicals and manufacturing
processes. Employers must also convene joint management-
employee health and safety commissions responsible for
training workers in hazard identification and prevention,
and to provide workers with access to their own medical
records (Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras 1992, p.
4; Witt 1991, p. 29)  Since 1987, employers have also had to
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inform the Secretariat of Labor of what chemicals they
handle (Montiel 1992).  In 1988, then-President Miguel de la
Madrid attempted a sweeping reform of environmental policy
by enacting the General Law of Ecological Balance and
Environmental Protection.  Like NEPA, it mandates all
private and public works to prepare environmental impact
assessments prior to construction that include information
about hazardous materials and other chemicals stored, used,
transported, manufactured, and emitted in their operations
that may cause ecological imbalances or exceed pollution
standards.    These assessments along with any accompanying
information must be made available to the public (General
Law 1988, Art. 33).  In 1992, the state of Baja California
joined nine other states in passing its own environmental
law.  The Baja California statute, however, contains a
right-to-know provision that guarantees public access to
documents, records, and auditor reports pertaining to
industries' processes and waste generation (Law of
Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection of the State
of Baja California 1992, Art. 29.)
The support that these legal provisions might lend to
prospects for establishing a federal right-to-know policy is
hampered, however, by the reality of Mexican society and
ͣ^^See General Law 1988.  Environmental impact assessments
with an accompanying risk analysis must be prepared by all
new industrial operations as a basis for receiving hazardous
waste and air emissions licenses.  Existing facilities need
not prepare an impact assessment but must obtain licenses
for hazardous discharges and air emissions.
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politics.  Although Mexico's laws incorporate many of the
elements of their U.S. counterparts, weak enforcement,
corruption, and bureaucratic disorganization have diluted or
undermined their efficacy.  One glaring example is the
problem with worker health and safety violations as
described by Maria Guadalupe Torres Martinez, a maquiladora
worker in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, and the leader of the
Border Committee of Women Workers.  She maintains that
management does not provide them with compulsory information
about workplace hazards, the use of protective equipment,
health effects from chemical exposures, or even the name of
the chemicals they use.  Most of the labels affixed to
chemical storage containers do not have Spanish
translations.  The only way that she and other workers can
obtain information from the labels is if they copy the words
and arrange for them to be translated.  Moreover, she
lamented, the majority of workers are not even aware that
they have the right to this information.  The union
leadership until recently, discouraged the workers from
studying the law.  She said that the Secretariat of Labor,
the agency responsible for enforcing the law, either ignores
health and safety violations or refuses to take appropriate
action on behalf of workers' complaints (Torres 1992).
In Tijuana, Baja California, the severity and frequency
of violations is greater due to the intinerant character of
the laborforce.  Miguel and Oralia Flores, members of the
International Group of Ecological Response and Environmental
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Health of the North, AIRESANO, explained that most of the
workers at the maquiladoras are migrants from other parts of
Mexico.  They come to Tijuana to work but the low wages and
poor living conditions cause them to leave for the U.S. or
their hometowns after three to six months.  With such a high
worker turn-over rate, workers cannot organize as they have
in Matamoros.  Consequently, there are no unions to protect
workers' interests or protest the actions of management.
Attempts at forming unions have mostly failed because
management is all too willing to fire workers who try to
organize (Flores and Flores 1992).  Dr. Adelia Moreno
Reglin, a company physician who spoke out against dangerous
chemical exposures at one plant until she was fired, said
that management offered bribes to inspectors to avoid making
improvements in ventilation and protective equipment (Reglin
1992) .
All along the border, both maquiladoras and SEDESOL
continue to ignore requests for information about plant
operations made by workers and citizens.  In Matamoros,
residents of Colonia (Neighborhood) Privado Uniones, Maria
Teresa Mendez Garcia and Sara De Leon Decantu, spoke about
living in close proximity to the Stepan Chemical Plant, a
maquiladora owned by an American firm with headquarters in
Illinois.  They and other residents of this poor, working-
class community allege that Stepan has dumped wastes into
open canals that run through the neighborhood and have
witnessed plant employees spilling barrels of unknown
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chemicals into unlined ponds on facility property.  When
they approached the company's vice president, William Meyer,
with a request for information about what chemicals the
plant uses and emits into the air, he replied that the
facility is in full compliance with Mexican laws.
Undaunted, a contingency of residents petitioned then-SEDUE
for information about Stepan's chemical operation and an
investigation into their illegal dumping.  An official
promised them the information and a full clean-up in 90
days, but when they returned unsatisfied three months later,
the same official backed away from his original promise (Day
Communications 1992).
Teresa Mendez and Sara De Leon say that it not uncommon
to wake in the middle of the night from the sound of an
explosion, from noxious vapors, or from foul odors.  They
told about how the community was overcome by a leak of some
kind of foul chemical into their plumbing which made them
nauseous.  At first no one from the government responded to
their complaint.  When a firefighters finally came, they
concluded that there was no problem — but without
collecting samples or running any tests.  The women tried to
get assistance from local authorities and SEDUE but each
claimed drainage to be the jurisdiction of the other.  Their
neighborhood has formed a committee that meets with other
committees to try to get information from industry and
SEDESOL about the risks from industrial operations.  But
without a law obligating them to release information, the
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women assert, neither the government or industry will
volunteer it (Mendez and De Leon 1992).
Manuel Montiel, an engineer with Quimica Fluor, a
Mexican chemical company, is a member of the Matamoros Local
Committee on Mutual Assistance (CLAM), an industry-supported
group that acts as a link between industry and the
government for planning emergency response.  The CLAM,
according to Montiel, was formed in 1985 to provide
technical assistance to firefighters, police, paramedics,
and other emergency responders that may be called to the
scene of a chemical accident.  A second objective of the
group is to inform the public about risks in the community
and how industry is managing those risks.  Montiel says that
the CLAM keeps files on the chemicals used on site by local
facilities, including Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs).
When asked whether citizens could obtain this information,
he replied that to his knowledge the CLAM has not yet been
approached by citizens for information.  Contradicting the
testimony of Teresa Mendez and Sara De Leon regarding their
experiences with other facilities in Matamoros, Montiel said
interested citizens may review the operating licenses filed
at his plant, but he claims no one has ever come to look at
them.  When asked about the public review provision of the
General Law, he replied that the public should not be able
to review industry's environmental impact assessments
because there is no way to guarantee that citizens would
have the technical expertise or political awareness to
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review the information fairly (Montiel 1992).  Yet when
citizens have attempted to learn more about manufacturing
processes and chemical through technical experts, industry
has responded negatively.  Teresa Mendez and Sara De Leon
tried to bring a technical expert along on a tour arranged
for their community at another plant but rather than allow
the expert to accompany the group, the company chose to
cancel the tour (Mendez and De Leon 1992).
Laura Durazo, a member of AIRESANO and director of the
Border Environmental Education Project (PFEA) in Tijuana,
Esteban Herrera Ugarte, an economist with the Mexican
Ecology Movement (MEM) in Mexico City, and other
environmentalists assert that SEDESOL's denial of citizen
demands for information results as much from its own
ignorance about industrial operations and waste generation
as from an intention to withhold information (Durazo 1992;
Flores and Flores 1992; Herrera 1992); the government cannot
provide data to the public that it cannot itself obtain from
industry.    Thus SEDESOL's ability to acguire data from
industry as part of a proposed national toxics inventory or
database, would be compromised unless it commits itself to
improving its own ability to obtain information through
ͣ' ͣ^See Perry, et. al., 1990 and Sanchez 1990 for a
description of the maquiladora industry in Mexicali, Baja
California, and its concurrent hazardous waste disposal
dilemma.  With regard to government ignorance, Sanchez
writes, "Even SEDUE, the agency in charge of environmental
protection in Mexico...does not have a broad inventory of
sources of waste and waste generated by the maquiladoras"
(p. 168).
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industry compliance.  However, this outcome would require
increased inspection capability, the elimination of
corruption, and the coordination of regulatory authority
among various federal, state, and municipal agencies (Mumme
1991, p. 29; Washington Post, April 4, 1993).  Manuel Flores
pointed out that although the municipality is responsible
for enforcing the laws and remediating contaminated sites,
the federal agency is in charge.  Neither local or state
structures have the resources or authority to make
decisions.  So when someone requests information from the
municipality, he or she is told that it is the federal
government's responsibility to provide it.  He added that
because information is centralized in Mexico City one must
wait to get the official story from the federal agency
eventhough the information is produced locally.  Oralia
Flores, who is responsible for conducting air quality
monitoring for Tijuana, indicated that she cannot respond to
requests for information because she does not have access to
the data (Flores and Flores 1992).
Although the compliance and jurisdictional issues
addressed above significantly impact SEDESOL's ability
access to industry information, the basic constraint on
citizens' legal right to the same information is the
government's motivation to exert control over information in
general.  Stevens (1974, p. 12) hypothesizes that the
Mexican government deliberately directs the flow of
information "with a mix of control and permissiveness" to
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enable decisionmakers to "pursue a relatively steady course
of economic development."  The examples of noncompliance on
the border lend plausibility to her theory.  The Mexican
government has included provisions for information
disclosure in its labor and environmental laws to appear in
synch with external influences, such as the U.N. and the
U.S., what Mumme and Nalven (1984, cited in Mumme 1988, p.
9) term the "demonstration effect", but fails to enforce
them in order to court maquiladora industries and their
economic benefits.  This symbolic gesture allows the
government to demonstrate sympathy with popular opinion
while at the same time eliminate the possible reprisals such
as strikes, protests, and opposition party voting that
public awareness could elicit.  When the government decides
in its best interest to disclose information, the data are
often unreliable, manipulated, or watered-down (Stevens
1974, p. 27).
Gerardo Segura, a professor at the Center for Ecology
at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, suspects
that the government manipulates data in order to keep up
appearances that it is effectively handling environmental
problems.  For example, instead of issuing actual figures to
a citizen requesting data on air pollution, the government
would only produce sanitized summary information.  The
university, according to Segura, does somewhat of a better
job of producing quality data through its own research
efforts and has created the University Program for the
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Environment which is intended as a way to link academia to
the public.  In Segura's research area, conservation and
forestry, the university can obtain information from
government not available to the general populous.  But, he
is quick to add that the information is accessible only
through a painfully slow, bureaucratic process entrenched in
clientelist system (Segura 1992).
The government not only restricts citizens' access to
information through official channels but also controls
information dissemination through the media.  Most of the
major daily newspapers, radio stations, and the nation's
largest private television network, Televisa all experience
some level of censorship or content manipulation by
government authorities (Christian Science Monitor. March 22,
1993).  In the case of print media, the government-
controlled corporation, the Anonymous Society of Paper
Producers and Importers (PIPSA), supplies newsprint and
printing paper to most publications at a considerable
savings (Stevens 1974, p. 43).  Through its monopoly over
paper sales the government secures press loyalty.  One does
not find in Mexico the type of investigative journalism and
editorial commentary that has fomented public opinion
against major polluters in the U.S. primarily due to
editors' self-censorship but also reporters' lack of
awareness about environmental issues.  Gerardo Segura
believes that the media's general ignorance about
environmental issues has been responsible for misinforming
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the public.  He said that media does not provide people with
the type of information that will help them take action or
find solutions (Segura 1992).  According to Laura Durazo,
the media will go so far as to describe an incident or
accident, give an estimate of the number of victims and stop
without investigating further or consulting outside
opinions.  Everything else is not considered "news".
(Durazo and Reglin 1992).-'-^
Network news broadcast by the country's two state-run
television networks and Televisa's four channels is even
further devoid of serious content.  "Each night when
[Mexicans] tune into the news, [they] see a country run by
dedicated public servants.  There is little sign of
corruption, and political opposition is rarely seen or
heard" (New York Times, June 7, 1993).  Carmen Hernandez de
Vasquez, the former technical secretary of the Municipal
Unit of Civil Protection in Tijuana once tried to bring
media attention to a local industrial site with extensive
chemical contamination.    Film footage shot by a news crew
ͣ' ͣ^See Coleman and Davis 1988 (p. 25) .  Exceptions are the
newspapers, Uno mas uno and La Jornada, and popular
intellectual journals, Vuelta. Nexos, and Proceso. the main
source of critical political commentary within Mexico's
major urban areas.
Manuel Montiel explained that the National System of Civil
Protection, [similar to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency in the U.S.], was established in 1986 and obligates
the federal, state, and local governments to participate in
planning for emergencies, including chemical.  States each
have a Council of Civil Protection which is similar to the
State Emergency Planning Commission (SERC) created under
EPCRA.  Mexico has adopted the United Nations Environment
Programme's Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at
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that accompanied her to the site required government
authorization before being aired and never appeared on the
evening's news (Vasquez 1992).  The government's purview
also extends to the content of radio broadcasts and results
in news programming comprised of government press releases
and limited educational and other public service programs
(Stevens 1974, p. 57).
Mexican border communities, however, benefit from their
proximity to the U.S. in that they can access both the local
papers and news broadcasts from Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
and California which report frequently on environmental
conditions in Mexico.  The Mexican print media in Matamoros
and Tijuana also publish stories about environmental
problems but there the papers limit coverage to factual
reports of current events minus background information and
commentary.  In a unique development that has followed the
recent trend in the U.S., Tijuana's radio programming has
expanded to include call-in talk shows that allow anyone to
express their views publicly.  Manuel Flores claims that
citizens get more information from these programs than they
can from other forms of media or direct inquiries to the
government (Flores and Flores 1992).
This apparent manipulation of the media suggests that
the government relies on its handling of information to
maintain influence among and allegiance from the populous.
the Local Level (APELL) as a guide for emergency planning
and contingency response (Montiel 1992).
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SEDESOL's enforcement efforts would certainly benefit from
data on industrial emissions and waste production, but, in
the hands of citizens, the data would surely increase
demands for action and legitimate public outcry against
government malfeasance.  If SEDESOL were to be held
accountable to a flood of requests from angry citizens and
environmental groups, its inability to meet their demands
because of budgetary or staff restrictions might leave the
government vulnerable to attacks from opposition parties and
a critical loss in popular support.  Consequently, as Evelyn
Stevens would predict, there does not appear to be any
incentive for the government to assist the public in
acquiring or understanding information that could be used to
unseat its power.  One individual from the U.S. who
requested anonymity asserted that the government's incentive
is to maintain power for the elites, an objective which is
incompatible with the enactment of a right-to-know law.  He
said that the government would be more inclined to provide
citizens with what it thinks they "need-to-know" published
in a report cleared for public distribution.
The lengths to which the government will go to maintain
its control are clearly illustrated in an example of
retribution carried out in Tijuana against Carmen Hernandez
de Vasquez when city officials fired her in March of 1992.
In her position with Civil Protection, she was responsible
for assessing potential emergencies involving natural
disasters or hazardous chemicals.  Her concern about a fire
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at a lead-acid battery reclamation plant and the potential
for disaster at an explosives manufacturer, both located in
close proximity to residential neighborhoods, prompted her
to inquire about the chemicals the facilities handled and
wastes they released off site.  Unable to collect
information from the facilities themselves or then-SEDUE,
she brought her concerns and frustrations to the attention
of her boss who told her that her investigation would only
panic the public.  When she persisted in her search for
information the authorities terminated her employment
(Vasquez 1992).
B.  Information in a Corporate Society
Right-to-know works for Americans because those with an
inclination to take action may affect the decisionmaking
process through a variety of different avenues.  Chief among
them are voting, litigation, lobbying, and community-based
forums.  Even with the Mexican government committed to
information dissemination, failure to meet the second
assumption for right-to-know, that is, that the means to act
exist, would narrow the utility of information for Mexican
citizens.  This next section will examine whether informed
Mexicans could become agents of change through the same
venues that Americans have.  The discussion will also focus
on the ability of Mexican environmental groups and other
NGOs to serve as mediating structures between the public and
these participatory mechanisms.
39
(1)  Voting.  The representative and pluralistic nature
of U.S. democracy affords the public with opportunities to
pressure elected officials to support its interests.
Citizens can write, call, visit, or petition members of
Congress to address their concerns.  Congressional
representatives, whose bids for reelection depend on public
opinion, are held accountable to their constituents in order
to secure votes for the next election.  In addition to
influencing policy through the legislative processs, U.S.
citizens can directly affect local or statewide policy
decisions through referendums or propositions.  In one such
referendum held in Asheville, North Carolina in 1989, voters
knowledgeable about upstream industrial chemical emissions
to the French Broad River, defeated a proposal to fund the
construction of a downstream water treatment plant incapable
of removing the contaminants (Tryens, et. al. 1990).
Mexican officials by contrast, are not held to the same
level of accountability.  Since congressional deputies and
senators are selected by the government establishment to run
for office and are constitutionally ineligible for
consecutive reelection, they have little incentive to act on
the behalf of their constituencies once elected (Camp 1993,
p. 137).  As Gerardo Segura noted, "We are a republic and we
are supposed to have representatives that should be aware of
our problems and represent us in Congress...but legally
there are some problems...The system doesn't have a
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framework where public participation...is managed" (Segura
1992).
Given this sobering reality, it is not surprising that
many Mexicans have reacted by not voting at all.  A 1989 Los
Angeles Times poll reported that in the 1988 elections,
nearly half of all eligible Mexican voters surveyed were not
registered.  The remaining respondents withheld their votes
based on their disbelief in the integrity of the electoral
process (Los Angeles Times. August 1989, as cited in Camp
1993, p. 62).^° Mexicans who do cast votes, especially for
the PRI, do so not out of "intense partisanship or by a
belief that their action will somehow affect what the regime
does" but to garner benefits from the government and local
power brokers (Cornelius and Craig 1989, p. 365, 367).^-'-
(2) Liticfation.  The judicial system provides another
forum for U.S. citizens to influence policy decisions.
Through the courts individuals and groups can challenge
on .     ."Respondents m this survey may have been representative of
a middle-class urban population which, according to
Cornelius and Craig 1989 (p. 366) and 1988 (p. 46) and
Coleman and Davis 1988, would be more likely to refrain from
voting than the urban and rural poor who rely more heavily
on the benefits garnered by voting.^-• ͣOn March 22, 1993, 330,000 Mexico City residents
participated in an unofficial plebiscite for the right to
democratically elect their local government.  Under the
present system, the president names the mayor and city
assembly, a relatively powerless body.  Nearly 85% of voters
demonstrated support for the creation of a local legislatureand approximately 67% supported statehood for the Federal
District.  While opposition forces heralded the event as a
symbol of the magnitude of the movement for democratic
reform, government officials countered that the modest
turnout was an indication of the public's disinterest in
changing the present system and democracy as a priority
issue. (New York Times, March 23, 1993).
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existing laws and legislation based on constitutionality,
sue governments or private parties for damages, and bring
justice to bear on violators of civil or criminal law.
EPCRA grants authority to citizens, local governments, and
states to file civil suits against regulated facilities that
fail to submit the mandatory information and reports
specified in the statute.^^  Citizens may also file suits
against the EPA or state agencies for not fulfilling their
obligations to provide public access to EPCRA data or
respond to requests from citizens for specific information
(Pritchard 1988, p. 241).  The citizen suit provision was
successfully employed for the first time by an environmental
group, the Atlantic States Legal Foundation, in 1990 against
Murray Sandblast and Paint of Buffalo, New York and resulted
in the company implementing a toxic use reduction plan
(Settina and Drum 1991, p. 6).  In another example, TRI data
formed the basis for a federal suit filed by a community
group and Texas United, a statewide advocacy group, to halt
a plant expansion proposed by a major polluter in Calhoun
County, Texas (Settina and Orum 1991, p. 3).
ͣ^^See Pritchard 1988 (p. 241) .  EPCRA allows for citizens
suits against facility owners and operators that fail to
submit a MSDS, a Tier 1 form, or a TRI form.  Citizens may
file suit against EPA for failing to publish the TRI,
respond to a petition to add or delete a chemical, establish
a a toxic chemical computer database, promulgate trade
secret regulations, or decide on a petition for trade secret
disclosure.  Action may also be taken by citizens against
the EPA, state government, or SERC for failing to provide
access to EPCRA information and against a state or SERC for
not responding to a request for Tier II information within
the allotted time period.
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The Mexican labor and environmental laws discussed
earlier do not specify any right to legal action by the
public.  Edgar Kruger of the American Friends Service
Committee and advocate for maquiladora workers in Matamoros,
acknowledges that individuals can seek indemnity under the
civil law, but to have any chance of succeeding they must
employ the services of an honest attorney, a daunting
economic challenge for most poor and working-class people,
and be willing to tolerate numerous delays (Kruger 1992).
Civil remedies also prove to be too costly for most
resource-poor environmental groups.  "Moreover, Mexican law
provides few protections for collective, or diffuse
interests" (Mumme 1991, note 66) which essentially precludes
opportunities for environmentalists to collaborate on legal
solutions in Mexican courts.  Gerardo Segura commented that
one can legally sue government agencies, as well, but the
process is so complicated, expensive, and politically risky,
few would dare to attempt it (Segura 1992).
Apart from tort claims, the only other recourse for
citizens is through a provision of the General Environmental
Law, described by Esteban Herrera whereby they can
officially complain to state and federal authorities against
suspected violators of environmental regulations (General
Law 1988, Art. 189-194).  Petitioners can require through
the Procuraduria del Medio Ambiente (Attorney General of the
Environment) that SEDESOL commence with an investigation
into their charges within 3 0 days (General Law 1988, Art.
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193).  But even this avenue still leaves remediation to the
discretion of the government with no guarantee that
complaints will actually be redressed.
(3) Lobbying.  In addition to interpreting EPCRA
mandated data and information for citizens, environmental
groups in the U.S. also spearhead efforts to lobby state and
federal legislators to support or reject particular bills
considered for passage.  Often, these groups develop their
own legislation that "friendly" representatives adopt for
introduction to the legislature.  Public Interest Research
Groups from Massachusetts and Oregon took action in 1989 to
reduce the high levels of toxic pollution reported in their
respective states in 1987, the first year TRI data was
compiled (Tryens, et. al. 1990, p. 2).  The two public
interest organizations set a precedent by designing model
state legislation aimed at toxic use reduction.  Using TRI
figures as a basis for their calculations, they convinced
citizens, industry leaders, and legislators that pollution
prevention could save money and reduce health risks.  In a
similar measure, the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC), a
public health group from San Diego, California, used
information about local toxic emissions from state and
federal inventory reports to demonstrate the need for buffer
zones around residences, daycare centers, and schools
located in a low-income/minority community.  In 1991, the
organization appeared before the Public Services and Safety
Committee of the city council to propose an amendment to the
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city's planning and zoning ordinance to create "toxics-free
neighborhoods" (Environmental Health Coalition 1992, p. 5).
The ability and incentive for Mexican citizens and
environmental groups to directly lobby policy decisions are
obviated by the corporatist structure and political system
in which "the federal legislature, which functions as a PRI
party caucus, has little independence in formulating or
modifying government policy" (Mumme 1991, p. 29).  Unlike
the legitimacy granted to the traditional labor, peasant,
and popular movements and the economic influence exerted by
the private sector, environmental organizations'
relationship with government is marginalized and often
contentious (Mumme 1991, p. 29).  MEM's Esteban Herrera
feels that government and industry do not take the
environmental movement seriously.  Since environmentalists
are always claiming damage to the environment, they are
viewed as adversaries rather than partners with government
and industry.  He added that in Mexico all social movements
are feared by the government (Herrera 1992).
(4) Community Action.   Often citizens may directly
affect the decisionmaking process or become decisionmakers
themselves through community-based forums such as local
emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and community advisory
committees (CACs).  LEPCs, on which community
representatives sit beside elected officials; law
enforcement, fire department, and rescue personnel;
journalists; and owners and operators of facilities
45
regulated by EPCRA, were organized primarily to develop
local emergency response plans for chemical accidents.  They
also serve as depositories for public information concerning
which facilities transport, store, or handle hazardous
substances; the identity of those substances; and the
material safety data sheets that describe the health effects
of each chemical (Hadden 1989b, p. 32; Pritchard 1988, p.
226).^^     Designated as a government body, the LEPC is
charged with establishing rules, giving public notice of its
activities, and determining procedures for responding to
public inquiries (Hadden 1989b, p. 29).  The experience of
an Ohio LEPC provides an ideal example of the type of impact
LEPC activities can have on local decisions.  As part of a
hazards analysis of facilities that handle extremely
hazardous substances, the Cuyuhoga County LEPC mapped a
vulnerability zone of areas and populations that would be
^ ͣ^The actual composition of LEPCs may differ by state.  Some
have interpreted the requirement to mean a five-member group
comprised of one each from each major category.  Others have
extended membership to numerous representatives from
subcategories within each major category (Hadden 1989b, p.
29).  The Cameron County LEPC representing Brownsville,
Texas is comprised of 17 individuals mostly representing
community emergency responders and local industry in the
county and across the border.  Jackie Lockett, the LEPC
Secretary, indicated that her group has been collaborating
with the CLAM in Matamoros to conduct joint emergency
response exercises and trainings programs.  But the LEPCs
ability to plan for emergencies and educate the public is
limited by its inability to obtain specific information on
what chemicals the maquiladoras and other Mexican plants
store, use, and transport.  While the LEPC has a legal right
to obtain this information from industries on the U.S. side
of the border under EPCRA, the LEPC does not have
jurisdiction in Mexico and cannot require Mexican industries
to provide similar information.
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affected by an accident at one of these facilities.  Based
on the LEPCs findings, which were placed in public
libraries, the Cleveland area's largest sewage treatment
plant decided to switch its disinfection agent from
extremely volatile chlorine gas to less volatile liquid
sodium hypochlorite (Settina and Drum 1991, p. 5).
When a chemical container exploded at the Armageddon
Recycling Company in Durham, North Carolina in 1983, a
coalition of neighborhood, public interest, and occupational
health and safety groups formed to demand an
investigation.    In response to the pressure exerted by
these groups, the City Council created the Durham Citizens'
Advisory Committee for Hazardous and Toxic Wastes Management
(Lynn 1987, p. 349-354).  The Durham CAC, comprised of
representatives from civic groups, local government,
industry, health and environmental interests, transportation
agencies, and agriculture, conducted a risk assessment of
the facility with funding from the state and assistance from
an outside consultant.  Based on the results of the
assessment, the Committee declared that the facility posed
an unacceptable risk to the community.  Its recommendation
to the City Council was the main determinant in the state's
final decision to relocate the plant.
^^See Lynn 1987 (p. 348) .  The coalition was comprised of
the neighborhood group. Citizens for a Safer East Durham,
the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group, the North
Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Group, and the
People's Alliance, a local advocacy group.
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citizen groups also directly negotiate "good neighbor
agreements" with polluting industries to reduce their
emissions.  Residents of Manchester, Texas, reached an
agreement with the Houston-area Rhone-Poulenc petrochemical
facility to allow community participation in annual safety
audits (Working Notes on Community Right-to-Know, Jan/Feb
1993, p. 1).  As part of the audit team, community
representatives have the right to inspect the facility,
interview workers, and review non-confidential documents
including hazard and risk assessments and emergency response
and waste reduction plans.  In an effort to ensure community
oversight of the agreement, citizens formed a CAC comprised
of several neighborhood associations.  As with other
examples of citizen action, this agreement was accomplished
in the wake of a chemical accident with assistance from an
environmental group, Texans United.
Mexicans belong to community organizations and
neighborhood associations, but these groups do not have
access to the official decisionmaking process.  Since most
policy initiatives emanate from Mexico City, citizens
essentially direct their organizing efforts at influencing
the implementation of policies that have already been
decided.  The Mexican government, however, has taken steps
to promote the idea that citizens participate in community-
based forums.
An example is Municipal Ecological Committees of
Citizen Participation.  These Committees were designed to
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involve representatives from "social" and "private"
organizations in "reviewing regulations for environmental
protection, promote [sic] environmental awareness generally
and provide [sic] a system to direct public attention to
existing problems" (EPA and SEDUE 1992, p. V-47).25  Esteban
Herrera and Gerardo Segura suspect that they are primarily a
symbolic attempt to decentralize participation in
decisionmaking (Herrera 1992; Segura 1992).  According to
Herrera, the Committees have no independent administrative
authority and operate in an advisory capacity, deferring to
the municipal government to take regulatory action (Herrera
1992).  And while representatives from academia, NGOs, and
political parties presumably sit on these committees,
citizens like Teresa Mendez, Sara De Leon, and Maria Torres
do not believe they have the commitment or ability to
promote community interests (Torres 1992; Mendez and De Leon
1992).  Few people it appears, including many of the
individuals interviewed for this study, have ever heard of
these Committees, are familiar with their purpose, or know
of ways for the public to participate.
Without a viable official alternative, communities rely
on mainly on staging publicity events and protest activities
to gain the attention of industry and the government.
^^"Social" organizations according to the description in the
EPA/SEDUE Integrated Border Environmental Plan (p. V-47),
are "trade unions, clubs, agricultural organizations,
sporting associations, and professional organizations."
"Private" organizations are defined as "industrial
associations, farmers' associations, and press
associations."
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Although it could be argued that this level of participation
does impact policy decisions, protest activity does not
equate to formal inclusion into the decisionmaking
apparatus, especially for groups that lack conventional
political resources (Lipsky 1968, p. 1144).  The degree of
attention and success these endeavors achieve is related in
part, therefore, to a community's economic class.  In
general, high- and middle-income Mexicans have become more
outspoken against the government and, in growing urban areas
in and around Mexico City and along the border, are
responsible for electing opposition candidates to local,
state, and legislative offices (Coleman and Davis 1988, p.
23; Camp 1993, p. 158).
A recent example of middle-class community action was
the campaign to forestall the operation of Tratamiento
Equilibrio Ecologico S.A. (TEESA), a commercial hazardous
waste incinerator situated adjacent to a Tijuana suburb and
several poor colonias.  Residents of Las Playas de Tijuana
("The Beaches"), among them teachers, doctors, housewives,
academics, and environmentalists, first organized to block
the construction of the facility begun in 1988, claiming
that inadequate transportation of waste to the site,
possible earthquakes, and the facility's proximity to
neighborhoods would lead to a major disaster (Los Angeles
Times, March 29, 1992).  The group never was never given an
opportunity to review the company's environmental impact
assessment, and with no means to affect construction already
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underway, the activists directed their efforts to halting
equipment tests scheduled for June of last year.  AIRESANO
organized a series of forums attended by opponents and
spokespersons from TEESA's U.S. operators, ChemWaste, at
which local experts testified about the health effects of
incineration and problems regulating the facility (Takvorian
1992).  At the same time, another community organization,
the Housewives of Las Playas de Tijuana, was staging protest
marches at the San Diego-Tijuana border (Los Angeles Times.
March 29, 1992).  The conflict finally ended on April 2 with
a decision handed down by President Salinas de Gortari to
revoke ChemWaste's operating license (San Diego Union
Tribune, April 3, 1992).
Despite appearances that the citizen's campaign was
responsible for the government's decision, Laura Durazo
conjectures that their victory was simply a product of
politics as usual — a political move that coincided with
other decisions made by the government at the same time.
She says the public had been totally shut out of the process
and kept from any information (Durazo and Reglin 1992).  The
decision was likely an action taken by President Salinas and
SEDUE to counter bad press coming from the U.S. and bolster
the environmental image of the Mexican government in light
of ongoing NAFTA negotiations.  Manuel Flores and Diane
Takvorian, director of the Environmental Health Coalition —
a group that has provided technical assistance to
environmentalists in Baja California — speculate that the
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reason why opposition to the incinerator gained momentum at
all was because educated, middle-class citizens whose
livelihoods were unaffected by the outcome embraced the
issue (Flores and Flores 1992; Takvorian 1992).  People
living in Tijuana's working-class and poor neighborhoods,
who rely on the precarious jobs provided by the maquiladoras
and other industries, could never afford the time or
unemployment to engage in formal protest.
The type of ongoing low-key protest waged against
polluters in the impoverished Privado Uniones neighborhood
in Matamoros, has been sustained by the presence of labor
activists, mostly women, who both live and work in the
colonia, and by the publicity generated by the binational
advocacy network, the Coalition for Justice in the
Maquiladoras.  Poor residents in Mexico City, have resorted
to using unconventional tactics to confront government
obstinance.  "Superbarrio", a masked wrestler-superhero,
appeared on the scene in 1986 on behalf of a coalition of
neighborhood associations "to oppose the bureaucracy, greedy
landlords, and political hacks" (Annis 1991, p. 101).  The
media awarded Superbarrio, and by extension, the coalition's
interests, extensive coverage as he led huge protests and
public negotiations with government officials over tenants'
rights and demands for low-cost housing.  "Through
Superbarrio [citizens] managed to generate considerable
excitement, a shared consciousness, and a formidable
political force" (Annis 1991, p. 102).  The above examples
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do not supplant the reality, however, that for each of the
movement that ever receives acknowledgement by the press and
the government, many more languish in obscurity.
(5) Roles of NGOs.  Informed communities across the
U.S. have formed grassroots groups to counter threats to
their health and safety.  The above examples highlight how
state and national public interest organizations have worked
closely with communities to act on their right-to-know.  In
an attempt to deal more systematically with right-to-know
issues at the local level, an affiliation of environmental
and public interest groups formed the Working Group on
Community Right-to-Know.  In 1989, the group began
publishing its newsletter. Working Notes on Community Right-
to-Know . a compendium of information on toxic pollution,
EPCRA, new right-to-know legislation, policy initiatives,
technical resources, and case studies that is circulated to
a national network of community activists.
Only a few environmental organizations like MEM, the
Ecologists' Alliance, and the Group of 100, out of the
approximately 75 currently in Mexico, are nationally
networked and have been outspoken in their calls for
government to act to protect the environment (Mumme 1991, p.
28).    The majority of these organizations are based in
^°A list of 75 groups obtained was obtained from a UN
Development Programme database of Mexican NGOs as of
10/2/92.  Breakdown includes 4 0 primary environmental
organizations, 29 development or social organizations that
include environmental issues in their programming, and 6
primary academic institutions.  The list does not include
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Mexico City, however, and are organized around air pollution
and conservation issues.  Border activists complain that
just like everything else in Mexico, the centralization of
the environmental movement in the capital has lead to
ignorance about problems in the North.  Maria Torres says
her group is trying to convey to these groups that the
border is part of Mexico too.  Yet despite their isolation,
border groups have benefitted, in terms of technical
assistance and media coverage, from contacts with
environmentalists in the U.S. in ways that the centrally-
based groups have not.  U.S. organizations like the American
Friends Service Committee and the Environmental Health
Coalition have been able to target communities with specific
needs for information and technical assistance.  Diane
Takvorian said that her group has been involved in hazardous
waste issues in Tijuana since 1985 (Takvorian 1992).
Funding appears to be the most serious issue with which
Mexican groups must contend.  Without adeguate funding, it
is likely that Mexican environmentalists will continue to be
marginalized in the political arena.  According to Esteban
Herrera, MEM does not have a strong financial base with
which to conduct major campaigns, hire experts, or conduct
independent studies.  They receive some donations but are
seeking external sources.  As of last year, the group had
been negotiating substantial funding with the Ministry of
state chapters of major organizations and smaller groups
located outside Mexico City.
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Finance (Herrera 1992).  Organizations fortunate enough to
receive foundation funding from the U.S. or the
international community may very well be disinclined from
speaking politically, asserts Laura Durazo of PFEA (which
receives such monies) and AIRESANO (which does not), since
U.S. money tends to raise suspicions among the public
(Durazo and Reglin 1992).  But without this money, she
cautions, groups like hers would be unable to conduct
educational programs and compile their own databases of
environmental information.  Gerardo Segura says the Center
for Ecology and other university research groups have
established relationships with international NGOs who can
provide the funding for their research that Mexican
organizations cannot.  The level at which universities are
funded compared to academic institutions outside Mexico,
however, limits the extent to which they can produce
environmental data and disseminate it to the public (Segura
1992) .
Finally, the inability for Mexican environmental
organizations to coalesce into a formidable movement is due
not only to the geographical distance between organizations.
It also results from differences in perspective about the
Mexican environmental agenda and how to pursue change in the
face of the current political system.  In central Mexico,
mainstream groups like MEM, according to Herrera, do not
want to be perceived as a social movement that contradicts
the government but instead, as a partner with government in
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solving problems within the framework of the current system
(Herrera 1992).  Environmentalists in border states, like
Manuel Flores in Baja California, reflect the emerging
political orientation in the North and believe greater
public involvement in decisionmaking at the state level
should be the movement's first priority (Flores and Flores
1992).
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A.  Conclusions
Prior research suggesting a strong belief among
Mexicans in democratic freedoms is supported by the
interviews conducted as part of this study.  Nearly every
Mexican questioned agreed that citizens should have a legal
right-to-know about chemicals in the environment.  Yet their
opinions about how right-to-know would be achieved or the
purpose that such a policy would serve reflect the
paternalistic character of the present governmental system.
In the context of this system, citizen participation remains
understandably oriented toward exacting concessions from
government or demanding it to uphold its promises and the
law rather than toward proposing and implementing
alternative policies.  Maria Torres remarked that since
citizens do not play a part in the legislative process, they
must try to get government to enforce the laws that already
exist (Torres 1992).  Right-to-know in her opinion, would
serve to incite anger among the public.  Esteban Herrera
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sees right-to-know data being used by environmental
organizations and government as the basis for better
research and administration of environmental policy (Herrera
1992).  Gerardo Segura believes that before right-to-know
could be effective, people would first need to become
empowered to pressure government and question the status quo
as they are now becoming in Mexico City and along the border
where environmental pollution is most severe (Segura 1992).
Manuel Flores speculates that right-to-know will eventually
take hold in Baja California and other states when the
political climate and relationship between the federal and
state and local governments becomes structured toward
greater pluralism (Flores 1992).
Given the information generated in this study, it does
not appear that right-to-know can be successfully applied to
Mexico under present political circumstances.  Mexico's
ability to meet any of the assumptions for establishing a
federal right-to-know policy is severely constrained by a
number of factors.  The key determining factor is the
apparent lack of political willpower and institutional
capacity on the part of the Mexican government to
demonstrate resolve in enforcing its extant laws.
Environmental and labor laws already require the disclosure
of specific information yet evidence cited in this study
indicates that the agencies charged with administering these
provisions are disinclined from effectively executing their
duties.
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Underlying the reticence of the government to provide
access to information already within the public's right, is
a need to regulate the intensity and frequency of popular
demands on the system.  In order to maintain its political
hegemony, the government must be able to balance finite
resources with an infinite number of demands from corporate
interests groups or risk the loss of popular support.
Environmental interests, are competing with the traditional
political interests of labor, the peasantry, popular
organizations, and the economic interests of the business
community.  Still an outsider, the environmental movement
has yet to be officially co-opted by the system.  However,
considering the propensity for dissention by the movement's
most ardent supporters, the middle-class, incorporation into
the regime's participatory apparatus could be only a few
years away.  Initially this move may afford
environmentalists with some income and leverage against
other interests in achieving environmental gains, but
paradoxically, it would also effectively eliminate any
control they have over steering the environmental agenda.
With even Hadden's basic form of right-to-know beyond
reach in an authoritarian regime, further discussion about
limits to public participation in decisionmaking is
unwarranted unless trends toward democratization continue
unfettered into the future.  If the political climate
changes such that the government gains incentive to enforce
disclosure laws and disseminate information to the public.
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then the level of participation afforded to citizens has
relevance for determining the utility of right-to-know.
Mexican case studies suggest that were information made
available to citizens within the present system,
institutional structures, or rather the lack of functional
ones, would still limit their activity to the prescribed
arenas of public forums, protests, and official petitions.
Moreover, unless the clientelist system were dismantled,
many people from poor and working-class communities would
continue to rely on its demonstrated ability to meet their
needs.  Of course, one would expect that the prerequisite
increase in pluralism and liberalization necessary to
redefine the government's relationship with information
would likely undermine the very corporatist structure
responsible for curtailing public participation.
Given that the reforms to both the electoral system and
corporatist structure promised by Salinas de Gortari have
yet to materialize with one year remaining in his six-year
term, the future of administration-promoted democratization
is uncertain.  There is an assumption that in the absence of
change initiated voluntarily from within Mexico, democratic
reforms could result from outside pressure associated with
the NAFTA.  What then would the NAFTA mean for right-to-
know? Independent of structural reforms, the NAFTA could
prompt the passage of specific right-to-know legislation or
require the establishment of a binational toxic release and
hazardous waste database for U.S. and Mexican industries
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operating throughout Mexico, similar to the one being
developed in the Border Plan.  However, it may be
unreasonable to expect the Mexican government to
unilaterally provide data on its private facilities and
state-owned enterprises without a compelling reason to
collect the information.  In the absence of economic
incentives, as argued in a previous section of this paper,
the Mexican government will not oblige them to provide any.
Thus, the most significant challenge facing right-to-
know as discrete legislation or as a provision of NAFTA
would be ensuring Mexico's compliance.  Jorge Castaneda and
Carlos Heredia advocate the creation of a supranational
entity to resolve disputes and impose sanctions on treaty
violators (Castaneda and Heredia 1992, p. 683).  The
function and jurisdiction of such an entity would certainly
call into question each country's sovereignty over its
territory.  Past experience with binational agreements and
projects to manage the border environment demonstrates that
the issues of sovereignty and accountability are not easily
dismissed or handled (Mumme 1992) .  At this point, it is
difficult to foresee how right-to-know might be implemented
in NAFTA since the Clinton administration has not released
any details of the collateral environmental agreement
currently being debated in Washington.
With the possibility for NAFTA-based right-to-know
still hypothetical at best, the provisions for public access
to regional data included in the Border Plan might provide a
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starting point for right-to-know in the six most northern
Mexican states.  But again, without a means of enforcing
requirements in the Plan, a non-binding agreement, one could
not guarantee that they will be fulfilled.  Also,
opportunities for extending the Plan's information
provisions to the Mexican and U.S.-owned industries located
beyond the geographic jurisdiction of the Plan, a concern
for Mexicans living in industrial strongholds like Monterrey
and Guadalajara, would likely not arise in the absence of
U.S. interest or additional funding to make it so.
Despite these dire predictions, environmentalists in
Tijuana and Mexico City, have faith that the system will
evolve to recognize their rights by the end of the decade.
In Baja California, where information disclosure has found
an official place in the state's environmental agenda, and a
popular movement for right-to-know is fomenting among the
middle-class, citizens might be able to use the law in the
form of a risk reduction strategy to assist government in
better regulating the gross contamination and latent hazards
plaguing their communities.  For the rest of Mexico, even
the most basic application of right-to-know will remain a
distant hope.
B.  Recommendations for Further Research
This study was essentially a theoretical exercise to
examine right-to-know policy from a comparative perspective.
Given its limitations in design and scope, certain questions
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were only partially explored and others were left completely
unanswered.  Suggestions for further research include:
* an empirical study on information policy and right-
to-know in Mexico using survey methodology or a
quantitative model;
* a policy analysis of the technical feasibility of
limited or voluntary right-to-know in Mexico
through international mechanisms like the NAFTA,
Agenda 21 or international NGOs; and
* additional comparative study that examines the
applicability of right-to-know in the U.S. to a
developing country with a different political
system, such as the parliamentary system in India,
or that explores the political, economic, and
technical aspects of right-to-know in two
developing countries.
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APPENDIX A:
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF SARA TITLE III
The purpose of SARA Title III is to improve local emergency response planning and increase
communication concerning toxic hazards by requiring companies to provide information about chemical
use, production, and releases to the environment.   The law has four major components: emergency
planning, emergency noUflcatJon, community right-to-know, and toxic chemical release reporting.
Reporting requirements under the law are complicated by the fact thai tliere are different lists of
chemicals for each section of the law, chemical quantities that trigger reporting differ according to the
chemical and the secdon of the law, and different types of companies are subject to different
' provisions.
Emergency Planning (§§301-303) designed to improve state and local emergency response and
preparedness capabilities through increased coordination and planning.   The law requires each state to
create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) which in turn designates local emergency
planning districts.   Each district forms a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), responsible for
developing and reviewing annually local emergency response plans.   Under §302, companies are
required to work with the LEPC if they have any of more than 350 extremely hazardous chemicals on
site in amounts above the threshold planning quantity (TPQ) established by EPA.   The TPQs range
from 2 to 10.000 pounds depending on the chemical's toxicity.   The law does not specify a company's
obligations for emergency planning, other than notifying the SERC and LEPC that it is subject to the
law and designating a representative to participate in the emergency planning process.   Under
§303(d)3, a facility must provide any information needed to develop the emergency plan upon request
from the LEPC.
Emergency Notification (§304) provides the public and emergency respondcrs with immediate
notification of accidental releases of substances that could harm human health or the environment.   The
notification requirements cover all of the chemicals listed under §302 as well as over 700 substances
listed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensadon Act (CERCLA).
Firms must notify slate and local emergency planning groups if Ihey release a listed substance in
excess of the rcportabic quantity thresholds, which range from 1 to 5,000 pounds.   Companies also
must submit to these groups a written follow-up notice that explains the response actions taken, known
or anticipated health risks from the release, and medical attention required by exposed persons.
Community Right-to-Know (§§311/312) makes information on the hazardous substances produced
and used by local firms publicly available.   Facilities that prepare MSDSs under OSHA's Hazard
Communication Standard must submit copies of MSDSs or lists of MSDS chemicals to the local fire
department, LEPC, and SERC.   The list of chemicals must identify the applicable hazard categories
defined by EPA (five hazard categories).   Facilities also must submit a hazardous chemical inventory
to these authorities.   The inventories must include Tier I informadon, which is aggregate data on the
amounts and locations of chemicals on site that fall into health and physical hazards categories defined
by EPA. Companies must provide more specific Tier II information if so requested by the local fire
department, LEPC, or SERC.
Toxic Chemical Release Reporting (§313) makes information on the type and volume of
chemicals that companies release, routinely or accidentally, into the environment publicly available.
There are over 3(X) chemicals on the §313 list.   Facilities are required to report annually ihe amount of
toxic chemicals diey release to Uie air, water, land, and transfer off site, if they: 1) use 10,0(X) pounds
or more of a listed toxic chemical, or manufacture or process 25,000 pounds or more of a listed toxic
chemical; 2) have 10 or more full-dme employees; and 3) conduct manufacturing operations (SIC
codes 20-39).   As required by SARA, EPA has compiled the §313 reports into a national computerized
database called the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), which is accessible to the public in print andelectronic formats.
Source:  Connelly, 1991,  Citizen Access and Use of the Toxics Release Inventory
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APPENDIX  C
Access to Information
1. Has the community begim asking questions about hazardous and toxic chemicals? Why?
(or begin by asking about a specific event, e.g. a particular spill or accident)
2. What are the community's major concerns about hazardous and toxic chemicals?
About the maquiladora industry?
3. How^ do citizens (you) obtain infomation about toxic spills or releases?
4.  What kind of information would you want to know about a spill or accidental release?
Probe: type of chemical
exposure
health effects
area of contamination
5. What type of infomation can you get now?
6. Which industries provide information for emergency planning?
Where is information available?
7. What is a Local Committee on Mutual Assistance?
Probe: which community
who is involved
type of activities
8.   Do CLAMs receive information on spills of toxic and hazardous chemicals?
What kind?
9.  How do citizens currently access infromation on, or in addition to spills and accidents:
routine emissions of chemicals
how much is stored on site
whether wastes are properly treated and disposed of
10.  What role does the media play in informing and educating citzens?
How effective is it?
11. If a computer database to track hazardous waste is developed according to the U.S.-Mexican border
plan, how will communities and the public gain access to the data?
Will they find specific information?
Will they be able to use the data for specific purposes?
12.  How would data collection and reports be financed?
Probe: government
non-governmental organizations
13.  What rights concerning information do citizens have now?
The right to access to information and data?
The right to obtain supplementary information to help interpret data?
The right to take action based on knowledge, e.g. lawsuits, publicity
13a.  If yes, please describe.
14. Do citizens know what their rights are?
How?
15. What type of information on toxics can citizens get from the government?
16. Is the information understandable as it is?
Does it need to be explained or interpreted?
17. Does a citizen who wants information have to follow a certain procedure to get it? Explain.
18. Who can citizens turn to for explanations of environmental data and other technical information?
19. What type of technical expertise is available to your organization?
(If an env. org., What type of information do you provide to citizens?)
20. Do you think the government should pass a law to require public access to information?
21. What provisions would you recommend that it include?     ^
(If an env. org., Has your organization been pressuring the government for such a law?)
Industry. Government, and Citizen Relationships
1. Describe the contact and communication you have with industry?
Probe: correspondence
meetings
legal action
good neighbor agreements
(If industry. Describe the contact and communication you have with the community and public
interest groups.)
2. How does the government and industry respond to requests for information?
3. How does industry respond to requests for plant tours, meetings, etc.?
4.   Have the maquiladoras been unwilling to report publicly, information on emissions, storage, and
transport of hazardous and toxic chemicals?
Why?
5. What are Municipal Ecological Committees?
6. Is your organization involved with a MEC (CME)?
How?
7.  Do you meet with U.S. groups accross the border to discuss these issues?
Probe: which groups
how often
set agenda
common issues
8.  Are maquiladora workers reluctant to challenge the companies where they work?
Provisions of the Border Plan
1.   The border plan only focuses on the area within 100km to either side of the border.   How are
communities outside this zone, for example, in Monterrey, addressing their concerns?
2. What is the likelihood that Mexico could carry out any of the activities proposed in the border plan
without U.S. funding?
3. What amoimt of money would be necessary to achieve the objectives of the border plan?
4. Has your organization commented on the border plan?
Is your testimony available?
Political Efficacy
1. Have there been any attemps at gaining RTK within Mexico through the legislature?
2. Are citizens' law suits utilized in Mexico?
3. Do citizens trust the government to act in their interest?
4.  Are some levels of government more reliable than others?
Probe: federal vs. state vs. local level
5.  Explain the public's role in the regulatory process.
' ^!^^(m^m
m
6.   What would be the most likely outcome from RTK in Mexico, citizen action or self-regulation by
industry?
7.  Are there opportunities to enact RTK legislation or local ordinances at the state or local level?
Does the process differ from the federal level?
Legal Precedent
1. When people are faced with a hazard, e.g., a consumer product, food, etc., how does the government
address public concerns?
Probe: consumer risk information on request
label items
Umit use of product
impose standards
ban product
2. Are there any consumer safety laws?
3. Are there any occupational safety laws in force to protect workers? Describe.
Which industries are regulated?
4.  What type of information do these laws require to be made available?
Probe: written lists of hazardous materials on premises
health consequences of exposure
recognition of hazardous
how to identify hazards
safe handling and use
medical records
safe disposal
5.  How do workers obtain information on hazards?
